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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELE-
PHONE & TELEGRAPH COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, a 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and GORDON RAY, doing business · 
under the name RAY TRANSPOR-
TATION COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
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7755 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES 
TEL. & TEL. COMPANY 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is an action at law upon a theory of negligence 
for the recovery of damages to the plaintiff's telephone 
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line. There is no dispute herein as to the manner of occur-
rence of plaintiff's damage. Appellant's gasoline truck 
and tank trailer ran twelve feet from the edge of State 
Highway 30 near Brigham City, Utah, and collided with 
a high transmission tower, breaking the concrete base of 
the tower and the electric wires on it and causing a gasoline 
explosion and fire which burned plaintiff's telephone pole 
and wires. The action was tried to the court without a 
jury, and the trial court made its findings of fact herein, 
finding that appellant was negligent in the manner of 
operation of its truck and trailer at the time and place of 
the said occurrence and that its negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's damage. The damage was stipu-
lated in the amount of Four Hundred Sixty-one Dollars 
($461.00), and judgment was made and entered in favor 
of plaintiff and against appellant in that amount. Although 
appellant's statement of facts shows that the plaintiff's 
damage resulted in the manner set out above, it does not 
either fully or clearly set forth the evidence upon which 
the trial court's findings of negligence and proximate cause 
were made. The following statement of facts is therefore 
essential. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's driver was operating a gasoline truck and 
tank trailer in a westerly direction on State Highway 30 
en route from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Tremonton, Utah 
(R. 21). Appellant was carrying a cargo of 7200 gallons 
of explosive gasoline ( R. 21) . The occurrence took place 
at approximately 6 o'clock a. m. on the morning of Feb-
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ruary 14, 1949, about three miles west of Brigham City, 
Utah (R. 21, 93). 
The following evidence shows that the appellant's 
driver should reasonably have known of the dangerous and 
unsafe condition of the highway. It was a winter of extra-
ordinarily heavy snow (R. 21). The said Highway 30 be-
tween Brigham City, Utah, and the point of accident was 
at a number of different places covered with ice and snow 
and there was small drifts of snow over the highway at 
different locations (R. 45, 55, 85, 103). Appellant's driver 
had been over the same stretch of road about six hours 
earlier en route from Tremonton, Utah, to Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R. 36, 37) ~ 
With full opportunity to have realized the dangerous 
:.:; conditions of the road, appellant's driver approached the 
··- point of the accident o·blivious to,_ the said conditions o·f the 
road. It was his belief that the road was dry between 
:G~ Brigham City, Utah, and the point of the accident (R. 21, 
~. 22, 32). The said driver had stopped in Brigham City, 
::;; Utah, a few minutes before the accident for coffee because 
he was sleepy (R. 50) . Despite the said conditions of the 
highway and the dangerous cargo which he was carrying, 
appellant's driver negligently and carelessly approached 
the point of the accident at a speed of probably 40 miles 
and not less than 30 miles an hour (R. 24, 40, 103). ~(': 
Apart from any prior notice of the conditions of the 
;,~ highway as set out above, appellant's driver had actual fore-
:c~~ warning of the condition of the road at and near the place 
gofl of the accident as he approached said place. Appellant's 
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driver saw that there were snow banks and ice and snow 
on and about the highway at the place of the accident (R. 
23). Appellant's driver saw that the width of the cleared 
portion of the road at the point of the accident was narrow 
(R. 24). Appellant's driver had this knowledge and an 
opportunity to act accordingly before he ever entered the 
drifted and snow covered area of the highway at the point 
of the accident (R. 24). Despite this knowledge of the 
conditions of the highway, appellant's driver either failed 
entirely to reduce the speed of his truck and trailer or re· 
duced it only slightly (R. 24, 56). 
As appellant's driver approached the drifted and snow 
covered area of the highway at the point of the accident 
and before he entered said area he could see a truck ap-
proaching from the opposite direction at least a mile off 
(R. 36). The approaching vehicle gave appellant's driver 
a one-flash light signal, which to truck drivers meant "cau-
tion" (R. 61, 62). In answer to this signal, appellant's 
driver responded with a two-flash light signal, which to 
truck drivers meant "okay, keep coming" (R. 38, 62). Appel-
lant's driver negligently and unreasonably failed to heed 
the caution signal given to him by the approaching vehicle 
and negligently and carelessly failed to respond to the sit-
uation by giving the approaching vehicle a caution signal. 
The force of the impact of appellant's truck with the 
electric high transmission tower and the length of the tire 
tracks left by appellant's truck and trailer in the snow 
clearly show the high and dangerous rate of speed at which 
appellant's truck and trailer must have been driven as 
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they approached the point of the accident. The tire tracks 
left by appellant's truck and trailer in the snow from the 
point where the truck left the highway to the point of col-
lision with the electric tower were 200 feet in length. (R. 
87). The said tracks ran through snow 36 inches deep 
(R. 45, 87). The impact of appellant's truck with the said 
high transmission tower was sufficiently great to break 
a concrete pillar about 12 inches square at the base of the 
electric tower, causing the tower and its wires to fall (R. 
46, 49). 
The record does not indicate that any reasonable effort 
was made by the appellant's driver to 'control· the move-
ment of his truck and trailer after it left the highway. The 
point of the collision was located 12 feet from the edge of 
the hard surface of the highway (R. 82). The tracks in the 
snow left by the appellant's truck and trailer ran in a per-
fectly straight line veering gradually from the highway 
to the point of the collision (R. 87). Appellant's driver 
admitted to Highway Patrolman Sackett immediately after 
the accident that the cause of the occurrence was that he 
had gotten into the narrow area of the road and that the 
movement of his truck and trailer was such that when he 
tried to slow down he lost control of the truck and trailer 
and skidded off the road (R. 39, 99, 100). 
No claim was made by appellant's driver after the 
accident that he had been crowded from the road (R. 39). 
It appears clear from the record that the width of the 
road at the point of the accident was such that if appel-
lant's driver had been operating his truck and trailer at a 
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reasonable rate of speed he could have passed vehicles ap-
proaching from the opposite direction without departing 
12 feet from the highway (R. 47, 48, 61, 69, 99). The ap-
pellant's truck and the approaching truck in fact passed 
in the narrow area before appellant turned off the road 
(R. 56). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT AT THE TIME 
AND PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT AND THAT 
HIS NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE. 
A. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING OF 
NEGLIGENCE. 
This is an action at law. The Court is here called 
upon to review certain findings of fact made by the trial 
court, sitting without a jury. No principle of law could 
be more clearly established than the one which this court 
has, time and time again, repeated with respect to this 
question. That principle is that it is not the function or the 
province of the appella~ court to determine what it or 
other reasonable minds would have concluded from the evi-
dence, but rather to determine whether there is any com-
petent evidence to support the trial court's findings. 
Beagley v. United States Gypsum Company, ... 
Utah ... , 235 P. (2d) 783. 
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The following pertinent statement was made by this Court 
in Tuft v. Brotherson, 106 Utah 499, 150 P. (2d) 384: 
"This is an action at law and the court, having 
the witnesses before it and being able to observe 
their conduct and demeanor on the witness stand, 
was in a better position to pass upon the evidence 
than is the appellate court. Under such circum-
stances, where there is evidence to support the court's 
findings, they will not be upset on appeal." 
The essential question on this appeal is, therefore, 
whether there is competent evidence from which the trial 
court could find, as it did, that appellant was negligent 
and his negligence the proximate cause of plaintiff's dam-
age. Plaintiff and respondent submits that· there is suf-
ficient competent evidence from which the trial court could 
find, as it did, that the appellant was negligent at and 
prior to the time and place of the said occurrence. 
The evidence shows that it was a winter of bad snows 
and that the highway on which appellant's driver was trav-
eling was at different places covered with ice and snow 
(R. 54, 55, 85, 93, 103). Appellant's driver had been over 
the same stretch of road about six hours prior to the oc-
currence (R. 36, 37). Appellant's truck and trailer con-
tained 7200 gallons of explosive gasoline (R. 21). Appel-
lant's driver was traveling 40 to 30 miles and hour as he 
~: approached the point of the accident ( R. 24, 103) . Cer-
tainly the trial court could reasonably find from this evi-
dence that appellant's truck and trailer were being driven 
at a rate of speed which was unreasonable and dangerous 
under the circumstances, those circumstances being the 
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nature of the cargo and the hazardous condition of the 
road. 
As appellant's driver approached the point of the ac-
cident, he had forewarning of the general condition of the 
road, and he had particular notice of the narrow area in 
the road caused by snow drifts (R. 23, 24). With knowl-
edge of this condition of the road, appellant's driver re-
duced his speed only slightly, if at all (R. 24, 56). Cer-
tainly the trial court could find that this constituted a 
failure to exercise reasonable care. 
As appellant's driver approached the point of the 
accident and saw the condition of the road, he could see a 
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction a distance 
of about one mile off (R. 36). The approaching vehicle 
gave a "caution" signal to which appellant's driver re-
sponded with an "okay, come ahead" signal (R. 37, 61, 62). 
Certainly the trial court could find from this evidence that 
appellant's driver, knowing said condition of·the highway, 
was negligent in giving the approaching vehicle a "come 
ahead" signal and in failing at that time, with knowledge 
of the conditions of the road, to give the approaching ve-
hicle a caution signal. 
There is evidence that as appellant's driver finally at-
tempted to reduce his speed, the tank trailer turned side-
ways, and that the said movement of the tank trailer pulled 
appellant's truck and trailer off the road and into the high 
transmission tower (R. 39, 99, 100). Certainly the Court 
could reasonably find from that evidence that the truck 
and trailer were being operated at a rate of speed which 
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was unreasonable under the circumstances because it did 
not allow appellant's driver to control the movement of the 
truck and trailer. 
Appellant's truck and trailer moved 200 feet through 
-. snow 36 inches deep and finally came to rest upon impact 
with a concrete pillar ten or twelve inches square, which 
:-: concrete pillar was broken by the impact (R. 45, 46, 49, 
87). Certainly the Court could find from that evidence 
-..: that the truck was being operated as it approached the 
point of the accident at an unreasonable and dangerous 
rate of speed? 
.:.· 
, The evidence is that the appellant's driver was entirely 
unaware that there was snow and ice on the road at dif-
ferent. places between Brigham City and the point of .the 
accident, in face of the testimony of all other witnesses 
that there was ice and snow on the highway (R. 21, 22). 
Appellant's driver had stopped in Brigham City for coffee 
because he was sleepy, according to his own admission (R. 
50). The trial court could reasonably find from that evi-
dence that appellant's driver failed to possess the alertness 
and failed to maintain the lookout of a reasonably prudent 
truck driver? 
The tracks left by appellant's truck and trailer in the 
snow indicated no movement or attempt by appeHant's 
driver to turn back toward the road (R. 87). The trial 
court could reasonably find from that evidence that the 
appellant's driver used poor and unreasonable judgment in 
turning from the road· and failed to make a reasonable 
effort to control the movement of his truck and trailer 
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after leaving the road, even if it believed that the driver 
turned from the highway intentionally. 
Viewing the evidence as a whole, apart from any spe-
cific part of it, there was certainly sufficient competent 
evidence from which the trial court could reasonably find 
that appellant was negligent in the manner of operation of 
its truck and trailer at and prior to the time and· place of 
the occurrence. 
The foregoing discussion has been made upon the 
assumption that the standard of care required of appel-
lant in transporting gasoline over the highways was or-
dinary care. There is considerable authority for the prop-
osition, however, that the standard of care imposed under 
such circumstances is of the highest degree. 
Burnhardt v. American Glycerine Co., 113 Kan. 
136, 213 Pac. 663 ; 
Ladlie v. American Glycerine Co., Kan .... , 
223 Pac. 272 ; 
Annotation, 31 A. L. R. 725; 
Annotation,· 44 A. L. R. 124. 
B. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDING OF PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
The essential question with respect to proximate cause 
is whether there is competent evidence upon which the trial 
court could find that appellant's driver should reasonably 
have foreseen that his aforesaid conduct constituted a risk 
of harm to persons and property on and about the highway. 
There can be no question but that plaintiff's damage was a 
direct result of the operation of appellant's truck. Surely 
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a reasonably prudent driver operating a truck and trailer 
containing 7200 gallons of gasoline on an ice and snow 
covered highway could and would foresee that a high rate 
of speed and failure to maintain a lookout would endanger 
property on and about the highway. Both the risk of harm 
to plaintiff's property and the damage itself were a probable 
and foreseeable result of appellant's negligence. It is well 
settled in this jurisdiction, as well as in most other juris-
dictions, that negligence is the proximate cause of damage 
even though the actor was not able to foresee the injury in 
the precise form in which it occurred or to anticipate the 
precise damage which flowed from his negligence. 
Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 
234 Pac. 300. 
Furkovich v. Bingham Coal & Lumber Co., 45 
Utah 89, 143 Pac. 121. 
38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Sec. 62. 
Restatement, Law of Torts, Volume 2, Section 
435. 
It is clear from the decisions of this Court that the 
driver of a truck transporting and handling gasoline is 
charged with knowledge that gasoline is highly volatile and 
will ignite readily causing damage to person and property 
in the area. 
Vadner v. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162, 45 P. 2d 561. 
This principle would seem to make it clear that appel-
lant should reasonably have foreseen that his conduct con-
stituted a risk of harm to plaintiff's property and other 
property in the area. 
Appellant would appear to argue in his brief that 
despite his conduct at and near the time and place of the 
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accident the real cause of plaintiff's damage was conduct 
on the part of the driver of an approaching truck; appel-
lant's argument is that his truck was the first in the narrow 
and drifted stretch of the highway and that he was forced 
from the road. This argument completely ignores the evi-
dence upon which the trial court based its findings. That 
evidence is as follows: Appellant's driver saw the truck 
approaching from the opposite direction when the latter 
was about a mile away. Appellant's truck had not then 
entered the snow covered and drifted part of the highway. 
Appellant's driver gave the approaching track an "Okay, 
come ahead" signal. Appellant's driver made no claim what-
soever after the collision that he had been crowded from 
the highway. The said driver admitted to the patrolman 
Sackett that the cause of the accident was that when he 
attempted to slow down his truck skidded and pulled him 
off the road. 
Apart from the foregoing evidence which disproves ap-
pellant's argument as to the facts, appellant's contention is 
incorrect as a matter of law. Negligence on the part of a 
third party concurring with appellant's negligence to pro-
duce plaintiff's damage does not relieve appellant of liabil-
ity. 
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 
61 Utah 116, 211 Pac. 706. 
Whether the conduct of the driver of the approaching 
truck was negligent or not, it was conduct which appel-
lant's driver could reasonably foresee. Certainly appellant's 
driver could not reasonably assume that the approaching 
vehicle would stop and allow him to speed through the snow 
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covered and drifted area on the highway. A reasonably 
prudent driver should foresee that approaching vehicles will 
make use of the highway. The negligence, if any, on the part 
of the driver of the approaching truck was reasonably fore-
seeable and did not constitute an independent sup~rseding 
cause of plaintiff's damage. The applicable principle of law 
followed by this and a great majority of jurisdictions is 
stated in Section 447 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
Vol. II, as follows : 
"The fact that an intervening act of a third 
person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent 
manner does not make it a superseding cause of 
harm to another which the actor's negligent conduct 
is a substantial factor in bringing about, if 
"(a) the actor at the time of his negligent con-
duct should have realized that a third per-
son might so act, or 
"(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation 
existing when the act of the third person 
was done would not regard it as highly 
extraordinary that the third person had 
so acted, or 
" (c) the intervening act is a normal response 
to a situation created by the actor's con-
duct and the manner in which it is done 
is not extraordinarily negligent." 
Plaintiff submits, therefore, that there is sufficient 
competent evidence from which the trial court could find as 
it did that appellant's negligence was the proximate cause 
of plaintiff's damage. Appellant cannot absolve himself 
from liability as to this plaintiff by claiming that as between 
him and a third party, both negligent, he had the right of 
way. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY 
OF WITNESS SACKETT REGARDING THE 
SPEED OF APPELLANT'S TRUCK. 
At the trial of this action a witness, Highway Patrol-
man Sackett, who had arrived at the point of the accident 
a short time after its occurrence and who had conversation 
with appellant's driver at said time and place, testified that 
his best recollection was that appellant's driver had told 
him he was traveling about forty miles an hour at and near 
the time and place of the accident. Appellant's attorney ob-
jected to this testimony and asked that it be stricken on the 
ground that it was not the best evidence. Appellant's request 
that the evidence be stricken was denied by the court. The 
argument is now made by appellant that the witness's testi-
mony regarding the speed of forty miles an hour was made 
on the basis of his inspection of a copy of the accident re-
port and that the evidence was therefore incompetent. 
Neither the objection made by appellant at the trial 
of this action nor the objection now raised for the first time 
on appeal has any merit. 
The objection made by appeallant at the trial that the 
officer's recollection was not the best evidence twists and 
distorts well settled rules of evidence. Of course, the best 
evidence as to a matter or occurrence is a witness's recol-
lections as to his personal observations ; this rule is axiom-
atic and has never been questioned. What has been questioned 
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by some courts is whether a witness may refresh his recol-
lection by referring to written reports. Appellant would 
change the rule to exclude evidence as to the independent 
recollection of a witness and admit only evidence in the 
form of a written report. This view is clearly erroneous. 
Appellant's argument on appeal is that the testimony 
of the officer relating to the speed of appellant's truck was 
improperly admitted because it was based upon the of-
ficer's examination of a copy of the accident report. This, 
it will appear, is an objection which was not made during 
the trial. Furthermore, appellant's contention is not sup-
ported by the evidence. 
Although the witness Sackett had access to the copy 
of the accident report the evidence referred to by appel-
lant at pages 12 and 13 of his brief does not disclose that 
the said witness based his recollections on said copy of the 
report. At most appellant's objection could go only to the 
weight of the evidence and not its competency-the weight 
to be given to the evidence was a matter for determination 
by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is Respondent and Plaintiff's position that there is 
sufficient competent evidence in the record from which 
the trial court, sitting as the trier of facts and observing 
at first hand the conduct and demeanor of witnesses could 
find that appellant was negligent and his negligence the 
proximate cause of plaintiff's damage. Appellant is in 
effect asking this Court to retry the facts of this action 
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and substitute its judgment as to the facts in place of 
findings of the trial court. The testimony of the witness 
Sackett with respect to appellant's driver's admission as 
to his speed was competent evidence and the court did not 
err in refusing to strike it. There is, however, evidence 
apart from that which is sufficient to support the trial 
court's findings. Respondent and Plaintiff submits that 
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
LEONARD J. LEWIS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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